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Kad: Publications And Reports and maybe some related stuff

#21 User is offline   Nissenice 

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Posted 21 November 2009 - 10:59 PM

Poisoning the Kad Network. Thomas Locher, David Mysicka, Stefan Schmid and Roger Wattenhofer. (2010)
http://www.cs.uni-pa...fan/icdcn10.pdf

Quote

Abstract. Since the demise of the Overnet network, the Kad network has become not only the most popular but also the only widely used peer-to-peer system based on a distributed hash table. It is likely that its user base will continue to grow in numbers over the next few years as, unlike the eDonkey network, it does not depend on central servers, which increases scalability and reliability. Moreover, the Kad network is more efficient than unstructured systems such as Gnutella. However, we show that today’s Kad network can be attacked in several ways by carrying out several (well-known) attacks on the Kad network. The presented attacks could be used either to hamper the correct functioning of the network itself, to censor contents, or to harm other entities in the Internet not participating in the Kad network such as ordinary web servers. While there are simple heuristics to reduce the impact of some of the attacks, we believe that the presented attacks cannot be thwarted easily in any fully decentralized peerto- peer system without some kind of a centralized certification and verification authority.


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A Peer Activity Study in eDonkey & Kad. Thomas Locher, David Mysicka, Stefan Schmid, Roger Wattenhofer. (Sep 2009)
http://www.dcg.ethz....ons/dynas09.pdf

Quote

Abstract. Although several fully decentralized peer-to-peer systems have been proposed in the literature, most existing systems still employ a centralized architecture. In order to compare these two paradigms, as a case study, we conduct measurements in the eDonkey and the Kad network—two of the most popular peer-to-peer systems in use today. We reengineered the eDonkey server software and integrated two modified servers into the eDonkey network in order to monitor traffic. Additionally, we implemented a Kad client exploiting a design weakness to spy on the traffic at arbitrary locations in the ID space. The goal of this study is to provide insight into the spacial and temporal distributions of the peers’ activities and also examine the searched contents. Finally, we discuss problems related to the collection of such data sets and investigate techniques to verify the representativeness of the measured data.


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Semester Thesis. Reverse Engineering of eMule. An Analysis of the Implementation of Kademlia in eMule. David Mysicka. (Summer 2006)
http://disco.ethz.ch...erse_report.pdf

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Abstract. eMule is a popular peer-to-peer (p2p) client which builds upon the severbased eDonkey2000 (ed2k) platform. In newer versions of eMule, lookups can also be performed over the serverless Kad-network, an implementation of a distributed hash table (DHT) called Kademlia. Since only little is known about the techniques and algorithms used by eMule, this thesis presents an analysis of the implementation of Kademlia in eMule. This includes the structure of the routing table, the connection phase with bootstrapping, searching and publishing in Kademlia, the behavior of the client if network address translation (NAT) or a firewall is used and an analysis of all message types used in Kademlia. The algorithms found are compared to the version described in the Kademlia paper. Additionally, a successful attack is presented, that removes an arbitrary keyword from the Kademlia network, using a modified version of the client.


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On the Impact of Content-Based Overlay Routing on Privacy. Adam Kubiaczyk, Igor Margasinski. (2009)
http://margasinski.c...ing-pts2009.pdf

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Abstract. In this paper we evaluate privacy information leaks via content-based overlay routing using an example of popular DHT network called KAD. Recent research has shown that content-based routing pose a significant threat for privacy and a number of improvements have been proposed. We analyse privacy of the improved content-based routing for KAD network using information entropy measurement model and show that the considered solution still can be a target of unsophisticated attacks.


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A Survey of DHT Security Techniques. Guido Urdaneta, Guillaume Pierre and Maarten van Steen. (2009)
http://www.cs.vu.nl/...2009.acm-cs.pdf

Quote

Abstract. Peer-to-peer networks based on Distributed Hash Tables (DHTs) have received considerable attention ever since their introduction in 2001. Unfortunately, DHT-based systems have shown to be notoriously difficult to protect against security attacks. Various reports have been published that discuss or classify general security issues, but so far a comprehensive survey describing the various proposed defenses has been lacking. In this paper, we present an overview of techniques reported in the literature for making DHT-based systems resistant to the three most important attacks that can be launched by malicious nodes participating in the DHT: (1) the Sybil attack, (2) the Eclipse attack, and (3) routing and storage attacks. We review the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed solutions and in doing so, confirm how difficult it is to secure DHT-based systems in an adversarial environment.


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:woot:

This post has been edited by Nissenice: 21 November 2009 - 11:08 PM

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#22 User is offline   binary256 

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Posted 22 November 2009 - 05:51 AM

Cool :punk:
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#23 User is offline   Some Support 

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Posted 22 November 2009 - 08:35 AM

Thanks for providing those :) I actually wonder why so few researchers (actually only one or two did) contact us, if not to discuss their findings then at least to notify us. I mean it seems like somethign you would do when researching a topic and its only a mail. Oh well :)

Quote

Poisoning the Kad Network. Thomas Locher, David Mysicka, Stefan Schmid and Roger Wattenhofer. (2010)

Mhm, strange paper. They seem to ignore eMules already implemented protections (which of course cannot avoid all attacks but some) and then conclude that "this behavior is not in accord with the protocol implemented in the real eMule client, we suspect that modified versions of the original client cause this effect." when some of those trigger and avoid attacks.

#24 User is offline   Nissenice 

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Posted 23 November 2009 - 12:22 AM

My pleasure!

View PostSome Support, on 22 November 2009 - 09:35 AM, said:

Mhm, strange paper. They seem to ignore eMules already implemented protections (which of course cannot avoid all attacks but some) and then conclude that "this behavior is not in accord with the protocol implemented in the real eMule client, we suspect that modified versions of the original client cause this effect." when some of those trigger and avoid attacks.

Yes it was a bit of a surprise. I missed that one though. Perhaps because I just assumed it was the behavior of some selfish client from the east. :D
I was reacting as well especially about the eclipse attack part as I've been checking the code about RoutingZone and RoutingBin and the limitations in contacts IPs recently. Even if it's still possible to launch such an attack, but only with the access to IPs from a lot more subnets.

The only parts I could find about the recent changes in eMule was in the abstracts: "While there are simple heuristics to reduce the impact of some of the attacks, we believe that the presented attacks cannot be thwarted easily in any fully decentralized peer-to-peer system without some kind of a centralized certification and verification
authority."
In a note: "In fact, Kad already uses public and private keys to authenticate peers whenever a new session starts."
And maybe this one: "A simple heuristic to render the Kad network more resilient to publish and eclipse attacks is to limit the amount of information a peer accepts from the same IP address, i.e., a peer does not allow that its entire contact list is filled by peers using the same IP address. This is also a critical solution as several peers behind a NAT may indeed have the same public IP address. What is more, an attacker with several IP addresses at its disposal can circumvent this security measure."
Not sure if the last one is suggestion or a fact though.

Another thing I miss is what eMule version they have studied. I can't find that anywhere...

View PostSome Support, on 22 November 2009 - 09:35 AM, said:

Thanks for providing those :) I actually wonder why so few researchers (actually only one or two did) contact us, if not to discuss their findings then at least to notify us. I mean it seems like somethign you would do when researching a topic and its only a mail. Oh well :)

So few, that's strange. Well, I've been wondering if there have been any contacts and I've been assuming there was some contacts with any of the authors of "Attacking the Kad Network" since the publish was delayed for quite some time and then they were mentioned in the change log. But that's only a guess from my part.

This post has been edited by Nissenice: 23 November 2009 - 12:25 AM

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#25 User is offline   Some Support 

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Posted 24 November 2009 - 10:50 AM

View PostNissenice, on 23 November 2009 - 12:22 AM, said:

So few, that's strange. Well, I've been wondering if there have been any contacts and I've been assuming there was some contacts with any of the authors of "Attacking the Kad Network" since the publish was delayed for quite some time and then they were mentioned in the change log. But that's only a guess from my part.

Yes there was quite some productive contact with these authors, as mentioned in the change log (and their papers are also most helpful in pointing out useful and realizeable ways to improve Kad), but they are the exception unfortunatly (I think one other autor contacted us besides them).

#26 User is offline   Nissenice 

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Posted 14 August 2010 - 09:59 AM

Hi folks! :D

Found some new papers about KAD. The first one describes a method to monitor and act on specific content in the network using distributed honeypots. The second paper by the same authors propose a method how to mitigate such an attack.



Monitoring and Controlling Content Access in KAD. Thibault Cholez, Isabelle Chrisment and Olivier Festor. (2010)
http://hal.inria.fr/...ents-Cholez.pdf

Quote

Abstract.—We propose a new distributed architecture that aims to investigate and control the spread of contents in the KAD P2P network through the indexation of keywords and files. Our solution can control the DHT at a local level with a new strategy bypassing the Sybil attack protections inserted in KAD. For the targeted DHT entries, we can monitor all requests emitted by the peers, from the initial content publication or search, to the final download request of fake files, assessing accurately peers interest to access it. We demonstrate the efficiency of our approach through experiments performed on the worldwide KAD network.


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Efficient DHT attack mitigation through peers’ ID distribution. Thibault Cholez, Isabelle Chrisment and Olivier Festor. (2010)
http://hal.archives-...tion-cholez.pdf

Quote

Abstract.—We present a new solution to protect the widely deployed KAD DHT against localized attacks which can take control over DHT entries. We show through measurements that the IDs distribution of the best peers found after a lookup process follows a geometric distribution. We then use this result to detect DHT attacks by comparing real peers’ ID distributions to the theoretical one thanks to the Kullback-Leibler divergence. When an attack is detected, we propose countermeasures that progressively remove suspicious peers from the list of possible contacts to provide a safe DHT access. Evaluations show that our method detects the most efficient attacks with a very small falsenegative rate, while countermeasures successfully filter almost all malicious peers involved in an attack. Moreover, our solution completely fits the current design of the KAD network and introduces no network overhead.

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#27 User is offline   Some Support 

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Posted 14 August 2010 - 04:27 PM

Thanks :) The first paper is not too surprising and we know that the weaknesses they exploit exists, much more intresting might be the proposed counter solutions. It is also nice to see how attacks have to get more and more sophisticated over time to have an effect on Kad at all :)

#28 User is offline   ElChele 

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Posted 14 August 2010 - 06:55 PM

Hi everyone
Submarines use countermeasures to confuse the enemy. :)
We should clone the emule (new instance + fake info), and deflect harmful connections toward the emule cloned. :)
Posted Image Make your own ipfilter file, and manage fake files. Take in count, You are the best filter for emule.
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#29 User is offline   Some Support 

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Posted 14 August 2010 - 09:04 PM

Kad and submarines aren't really comparable :)

#30 User is offline   ElChele 

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Posted 14 August 2010 - 11:19 PM

View PostSome Support, on 14 August 2010 - 11:04 PM, said:

Kad and submarines aren't really comparable :)


Sure. :D
Posted Image Make your own ipfilter file, and manage fake files. Take in count, You are the best filter for emule.
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#31 User is offline   Nissenice 

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Posted 17 August 2010 - 09:38 PM

View PostSome Support, on 14 August 2010 - 06:27 PM, said:

Thanks :) The first paper is not too surprising and we know that the weaknesses they exploit exists, much more intresting might be the proposed counter solutions.

You're welcome! I find this quite interesting so the pleasure is all mine. :)
The first paper is more or less a repeat of earlier paper(s) they have published. In their countermeasure (second paper) they are proposing to remove nodes which are considered evil. Perhaps that's not the best way to go?

I had a slightly different approach in mind while studying their earlier papers 7-8 months ago. It went something like this if I remember correctly:
First try to make a judgement if there is an attack around the targetID and if so try to make an analysis of the severity of the attack.
Second, when publishing a keyword or file, publish as usual, but depending on the grade of the attack, publish at more or less extra nodes. Especially if it is rare file.
Third, when searching a keyword or a file, ask the candidate nodes in a random weighted order where the weight depends on the closeness to the targetID and the likelihood that it is not an malicious node.
Hope you get the big picture.

Quote

It is also nice to see how attacks have to get more and more sophisticated over time to have an effect on Kad at all :)

Yes indeed. I have a vague feeling though, that in the "end", but not for the nearest hundred years or so I hope, there will be graph analysis, reputation systems and such... :cry2:

View PostElChele, on 14 August 2010 - 08:55 PM, said:

Hi everyone
Submarines use countermeasures to confuse the enemy. :)
We should clone the emule (new instance + fake info), and deflect harmful connections toward the emule cloned. :)

Well, we could clone the targetID and change it a bit while searching for closer nodes, but that would only make sense if the network is wired while asking for closer nodes. Then it would be a bit confusing. Otherwise not. :P

This post has been edited by Nissenice: 17 August 2010 - 10:01 PM

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#32 User is offline   ElChele 

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Posted 18 August 2010 - 10:07 AM

Quote

they are proposing to remove nodes which are considered evil. Perhaps that's not the best way to go?


When you have identified the enemy, why remove it?; someone else will comes to take his place, and you will have to identify him again.
Do not remove, just use it. give wrong information, sending evil node to the cloned targetID, where will be waiting him a nice infinite loop, put him to divide by zero. :devil:

Then comes the time of the mutation, you have to reprogram all the nodes and send them back again to the base. They will share this information with other nodes that are like them, so that, they cease to be bad boys. :P
Posted Image Make your own ipfilter file, and manage fake files. Take in count, You are the best filter for emule.
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#33 User is offline   Nissenice 

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Posted 22 August 2010 - 08:11 AM

Hi again! A few more papers to read while relaxing in bed.

First one I haven't been able to find a proper copy of yet, but only a link to google books. Sorry about that. This paper is introducing fake nodes while eclipsing content. The second paper is a general overview of security issues. Third one investigates exploits that can be used to target any IP. Fourth one I haven't start reading yet, but it doesn't seem to be that hurry either: "However, the latest version of the eMule clients (version 0.49b and 0.49c) do implement a mitigation for our attacks, after some discussions with the developers of eMule."
Oh, bye the way, there is actually one thing that can be read in one of the papers that makes one's eyebrows approach the neck. But it has nothing to do with any attacks, exploits or anything like that... :ph34r:


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Conducting and Optimizing Eclipse Attacks in the Kad Peer-to-Peer Network. Michael Kohnen, Mike Leske and Erwin P. Rathgeb. (2009)
http://www.google.co...epage&q&f=false

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Abstract. The Kad network is a structured P2P network used for file sharing. Research has proved that Sybil and Eclipse attacks have been possible in it until recently. However, the past attacks are prohibited by newly implemented security measures in the client applications. We present a new attack concept which overcomes the countermeasures and prove its practicability. Furthermore, we analyze the efficiency of our concept and identify the minimally required resources.


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Security Issues in Structured P2P Overlay Networks. Mikko Vestola. (2010)
http://www.cse.tkk.f...stola_final.pdf

Quote

Abstract. Nowadays, P2P networks are used for many purposes, such as files sharing, instant message communication and distributed computing. Popular services such as Skype, Bit-Torrent and eMule rely on P2P networks. This makes the networks an attractive target for attackers. Over time, researchers have discovered some major security problems with P2P networks, which most of them have been now wellknown for a long time. This study describes the most important security issues in the overlay level of structured P2P networks. The following attacks are included: Sybil attack, ID mapping attack, Eclipse attack, identity theft and churn attack. These attacks are not just theoretical, but, some of them are surprisingly easy to perform in real-life P2P networks. Several countermeasures exist, which are analyzed in this paper, as well as how the attacks are related to each other. This study shows that structured P2P networks can be seriously compromised if they are not effectively protected against these attacks. For example, in an unprotected distributed file sharing network, a malicious user can intercept file requests and return data of its own choosing. In the worst case, an adversary might eventually be able to gain full control over the whole network and cause a denial-of-service attack.


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Preventing DDoS attacks on internet servers exploiting P2P systems. Xin Sun, Ruben Torres and Sanjay Rao. (2010)
http://cobweb.ecn.pu...comnet-ddos.pdf

Quote

Abstract. Recently, there has been a spurt of work [1–7] showing that a variety of extensively deployed P2P systems may be exploited to launch DDoS attacks on web and other Internet servers, external to the P2P system. In this paper, we dissect these attacks and categorize them based on the underlying cause for attack amplification. We show that the attacks stem from a violation of three key principles: (i) membership information must be validated before use; (ii) innocent participants must only propagate validated information; and (iii) the system must protect against multiple references to the victim. We systematically explore the effectiveness of an active probing approach to validating membership information in thwarting such DDoS attacks. The approach does not rely on centralized authorities for membership verification, and is applicable to both structured (DHT-based) and unstructured P2P systems. We believe these considerations are important to ensure the mechanisms can be integrated with a range of existing P2P deployments. We evaluate the techniques in the context of a widely deployed DHT-based file-sharing system, and a video broadcasting system with stringent performance requirements. Our results show the promise of the approach in limiting DDoS attacks while not sacrificing application performance.


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Attacking the Kad network — real world evaluation and high fidelity simulation using DVN. Peng Wang, James Tyra, Eric Chan-Tin, Tyson Malchow, Denis Foo Kune, Nicholas Hopper and Yongdae Kim. (2009)
http://www-users.cs....ack_journal.pdf

Quote

Abstract. The Kad network, an implementation of the Kademlia DHT protocol, supports the popular eDonkey peer-to-peer file sharing network and has over 1 million concurrent nodes.We describe several attacks that exploit critical design weaknesses in Kad to allow an attacker with modest resources to cause a significant fraction of all searches to fail. We measure the cost and effectiveness of these attacks against a set of 16 000 nodes connected to the operational Kad network. Using our large-scale simulator, DVN, we successfully scaled up to a 200 000 node experiment. We also measure the cost of previously proposed, generic DHT attacks against the Kad network and find that our attacks are much more cost effective. Finally, we introduce and evaluate simple mechanisms to significantly increase the cost of these attacks.


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This post has been edited by Nissenice: 22 August 2010 - 08:13 AM

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#34 User is offline   Ejack79 

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Posted 23 August 2010 - 12:39 AM

Thanks to Nissenice!
But strange enough the last two look like some articles posted before:

Quote

[Preventing DDoS Attacks with P2P Systems through Robust Membership Management][Xin Sun, Ruben Torres and Sanjay Rao][2007.2].pdf
[Attacking the Kad Network][Peng Wang, James Tyra, Eric Chan-Tin, Tyson Malchow, Denis Foo Kune, Nicholas Hopper, Yongdae Kim][2008.9].pdf

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#35 User is offline   Nissenice 

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Posted 25 August 2010 - 01:27 AM

View PostEjack79, on 23 August 2010 - 02:39 AM, said:

Thanks to Nissenice!
But strange enough the last two look like some articles posted before:


Hehe, thanks! I bet those guys will be happy when they found out that they have not making any progress in their Kad-research during the years. I hope for their sake that they will spared this discovery though. :P

Joke a side, if you look closely, I think you will find that there are more papers than that which are closely related. That's just natural I guess. A study is started and as long as the researchers don't feel that they are finished and as long there's an interest and someone is paying for the research they will continue.


I'm pretty sure though I haven't posted about this paper about pollution before... ? :unsure:


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WINNOWING : Protecting P2P Systems Against Pollution By Cooperative Index Filtering. Kyuyong Shin, Douglas S. Reeves, Injong Rhee, Yoonki Song. (2009)
ftp://ftp.csc.ncsu.e...9/TR-2009-2.pdf

Quote

Abstract.—Pollution (i.e., sharing corrupted files, or contaminating index information with bogus index records) is a de facto problem in many file sharing Peer-to-Peer (P2P) systems. Since pollution squanders network resources and frustrates users with unprofitable downloads (due to polluted files) and unproductive download requests (due to bogus index records), the future success of file sharing based P2P systems is questionable unless properly addressed.
In this paper, we propose a novel anti-pollution scheme called winnowing. Winnowing aims to purify the index records (i.e. the information on files or the publishers) held by each index node in the system, so that download attempts based on these index records are more likely to yield satisfactory results. To attain this goal, index nodes block bogus publish messages by verifying the publisher and the contents of the publish message upon receipt of a keyword or content publish message. Second, index nodes collect feedback from the users who have downloaded files via their index records. The collected feedback is then processed and reflected in the matching index record in a novel way. Careful consideration is given to reducing the impact of false feedback, and malicious index nodes.
Publish message verification has been implemented on top of the latest eMule client and extensive data has been collected from the Kad network, using this modified client. The measurement results are summarized in this paper. The the findings from the measurement study are incorporated into our analytical model, which is used to investigate the performance of user feedback mediation. The model demonstrates the effectiveness of user feedback mediation: fast convergence to near-optimal performance and insensitivity to various pollution attacks including the attacks which attempt to bypass winnowing.


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#36 User is offline   Nissenice 

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Post icon  Posted 07 September 2010 - 01:00 AM

Hi! Sitting here reading about the reflection attack scenario against older client versions presented in "Attacking the Kad network---real world evaluation and high fidelity simulation using DVN" by Wang et al (page 15, see link in post above).

Quote

However, a slight twist on this attack involves hijacking
a node’s entire routing table so that the entries in the
routing table point to the victim itself rather than to
the attacker—we call this the reflection attack.
(...)
Since a node does not perform any check on
an IP address and port to determine whether it is its
own, a hijacked node will continue to send messages
to itself and reply to itself (...)

:ranting:


That one was quite nasty!
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#37 User is offline   pier4r 

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Posted 31 October 2010 - 09:15 AM

@Nissenice: do you search publications with tools such as this http://scholar.googl...=it&as_sdt=2000 ?

PS. I have noted that you collect a lot of papers about p2p, may i suggest you to create a topic (or an external page) as a bookmark? Yours searches are really useful!

This post has been edited by pier4r: 31 October 2010 - 09:16 AM

>>> My wiki (ITA) on emule >>>Feature Request (ICS) or SOTN, ClientAnalyzer >>>EmuleCollectionV2 same KAD load but more and more published files in the same time >>>Emule on old hardware (pentium 2 or 3 - c3 - and so on) with good OS settings and enough ram (256 mb): win >>>user of: Xtreme 6.1|7.2, ZZUL bastard 1.9.10, SharX 1.7|1.8b5, SharkX 1.8b5 pierQR 0.1|0.6, ZZUL-Tra 1.9|?
.My SF
###.it
. Le capacità logiche di qualcuno sono riassumibili con le frasi: click.
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#38 User is offline   fox88 

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Posted 31 October 2010 - 11:06 AM

View Postpier4r, on 31 October 2010 - 12:15 PM, said:

may i suggest you to create a topic (or an external page) as a bookmark?

Request to create a special topic inside already special "Kad: Publications And Reports" is very much like an attack described in the message #36. :P
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#39 User is offline   pier4r 

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Posted 01 November 2010 - 12:34 PM

View Postfox88, on 31 October 2010 - 12:06 PM, said:

Request to create a special topic inside already special "Kad: Publications And Reports" is very much like an attack described in the message #36. :P


Of course it will be a special topic (or external page) for all publications found by Nissenice.

For example: http://forum.emule-p...owtopic=151214. Those publications aren't about Kad, but can be useful.
>>> My wiki (ITA) on emule >>>Feature Request (ICS) or SOTN, ClientAnalyzer >>>EmuleCollectionV2 same KAD load but more and more published files in the same time >>>Emule on old hardware (pentium 2 or 3 - c3 - and so on) with good OS settings and enough ram (256 mb): win >>>user of: Xtreme 6.1|7.2, ZZUL bastard 1.9.10, SharX 1.7|1.8b5, SharkX 1.8b5 pierQR 0.1|0.6, ZZUL-Tra 1.9|?
.My SF
###.it
. Le capacità logiche di qualcuno sono riassumibili con le frasi: click.
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#40 User is offline   Nissenice 

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Posted 02 November 2010 - 10:12 PM

View Postpier4r, on 31 October 2010 - 10:15 AM, said:

do you search publications with tools such as this http://scholar.googl...=it&as_sdt=2000 ?

Yes, I do. But I use ordinary google too and sometimes other search engines as well. Other times I try to find the authors homepages as they usually list their publications and with a little luck one can find the pdf-link to the article in question or another one that looks interesting as well. ;)

View Postpier4r, on 31 October 2010 - 10:15 AM, said:

PS. I have noted that you collect a lot of papers about p2p, may i suggest you to create a topic (or an external page) as a bookmark? Yours searches are really useful!

Thanks! Ok, I'll think about it. If I do it'll probably be here on the board in some way or another..
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